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Paradox of analysis
The Paradox of analysis is a paradox that concerns how an analysis can be both correct and informative. Although the problem takes its origin from the conflict in Plato's ''Meno'', it was formulated in its complete form by philosopher G. E. Moore in his book Principia Ethica, and first named by C.H. Langford in his 1942 article "The Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy".
==The paradox==
A conceptual analysis is something like the definition of a word. However, unlike a standard dictionary definition (which may list examples or talk about related terms as well), a completely correct analysis of a concept in terms of others seems like it should have exactly the same meaning as the original concept. Thus, in order to be correct, the analysis should be able to be used in any context where the original concept is used, without changing the meaning of the discussion in context. Conceptual analyses of this sort are a major goal of analytic philosophy.
However, if such an analysis is to be useful, it should be informative. That is, it should tell us something we don't already know (or at least, something one can imagine someone might not already know). But it seems that no conceptual analysis can both meet the requirement of correctness and of informativeness, on these understandings of the requirements.
To see why, consider a potential simple analysis:
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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